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Purpose: The aim of this study is to provide a warning sign for fraud studies in developing 
occupational fraud deterrent, and offer possible solution to deal with it.  
Design/methodology/approach: This study was conducted in one of regencies in Indonesia. 
We interviewed nine top managers across local agencies and four senior local government 
internal auditors. The people involved have formal and informal networks with a regent who 
has been arrested by Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission, because of white-
collar crime syndicates, when running governmental systems.  
Findings: Whilst many approaches to fraud mitigation have been proposed, organisations in 
practice particularly in the public sector find it hard to implement successful methods to 
understand, detect and prevent fraud. In practice this occurs due to simplified assumption 
on or multiplicity of overlapping fraud concepts. There is also a lack of appreciation of 
impact of organisational dynamics which facilitates fraud. Behavioural and political issues 
within an organisation need to be addressed when proposing fraud prevention. The study 
emphasises that it is too naïve to offer internal control as one-size-fits-all fraud prevention. 
For practitioners, corrupt behaviour tends to be the most challenging part, compared to 
other fraud schemes such as asset misappropriation and financial statement fraud. In this 
paper, we urge organisation to adapt a more systematic approach, involving across 
governmental anti-corruption agencies and civil society actors. This may be facilitated 
through communication among those parties, including a sound whistleblowing system. 
Then, organisation also should consider preventive measures that go beyond from 
administrative or technical internal controls.  
Originality/value: Our results may give new directions for designing fraud prevention.  
 




Fraud is costly for society and needs appropriate mitigation. A clear understanding of fraud 
and the behaviour of the fraudsters is required. White-collar fraud, especially within the 
public sector, is prevalent and has attracted considerable attention from academics (e.g. 
Engdahl and Larsson, 2016; Goossen et al. 2016; Locker and Godfrey, 2006), and 
professional organisations (AFCE, 2018; PwC, 2018). These studies often seek to explore the 
reasoning behind an individual's decision to commit workplace fraud. For example, Goossen 
et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between human values and three types of white-
collar crime: tax evasion, insurance fraud and bribery covering 14 European countries. Their 
study shows, individual values, such as self-advancement, seeking control, individual 
competence, status and prestige, challenge, excitement and independence, are positively 
related to white-collar crime. In contrast, they also find values associated with broad 
motivational goals of welfare, tolerance, social order and relational stability are negatively 
related to the occurrences of white-collar crimes. Craig and Piquero (2016) analyse white-
collar offending (e.g. embezzlement) from personality traits of offenders. They conclude 
individuals who experience ‘low self-control’ are more likely to offend. As we can see, this 
literature depicts how a number of individual value types or personality traits support the 
likelihood of white-collar offending. Such work can help management to be more aware of 
what behaviour is acceptable or unacceptable. It is also worth noting that such work will 
allow us to point out psychological anomalies that may help management to conduct in-
depth analysis and gain deeper understanding of the likelihood of fraud being committed. 
Whilst those scholars are in near consensus about psychological triggers to defraud, 
development of mitigations remains infeasible without a clear sense of theoretical approach 
to understand the fraud risk landscape (Anald et al. 2015). It means, it is not enough just to 
look at the original state of psychological triggers when dissecting fraudulent behaviours.  
Power (2013) argues, a large proportion of fraud prevention and detection, remains to be 
seriously challenged. He indicated that it is difficult for anti-fraud professionals to design 
good behavioural systems which can protect organisations (Power, 2013). Constant vigilance 
is required (Davis and Pesch, 2013), leading Holtfreter et al. (2008) to be pessimistic and 
hence sceptical about success, indicating that the United States Department of Justice have 
given ‘low priority’ to white collar crime compared to violent crime and threats to national 
security, such as terrorist attacks. Surprisingly, to date the discussions about preventive 
measures for causes of fraud quite often do not touch on the complexity of situational and 
sociological constructs within and outside organisation (e.g. see, Rodgers et al. 2015). 
Rodgers et al (2015) are optimistic that ethics and internal controls - accounting and 
administrative controls - can be appropriate solutions. Equally this paper takes a positive 
view of taking action to achieving fraud prevention by extending the evidence base on which 
such measures are based. 
Recognition of why fraudulent situations appear unmanageable or even unpreventable is a 
step forward in designing better system. This study addresses the need for further empirical 
work to reduce the different types of fraud (Anand et al. 2015), and the kinds of situations in 
which fraud is more or less likely to occur (Akkeren and Buckby ,2017). The critical debate 
about occupational fraud prevention processes, goes beyond the challenges of determining 
the mode of operation of fraud and the opportunistic conditions are allowing fraud to occur. 
The paper takes the following route: Initially, there will be an exploration of the concept of 
fraud and the dynamics of corrupt organisations. Then, the research design is discussed. This 
leads on to the analysis, discussion and conclusion which addresses why certain commercial 
concerns find it easier to control fraud and as such how a holistic approach can be taken to 
fraud prevention.  
 
Conceptualisation of fraud  
Tackling an issue needs a clear understanding of the conceptualisation of the subject. This is 
clear from reviews of the subject, see Soltani (2014) and Ang, et al. (2016). These authors 
tend to generalise the term fraud. Soltani’s (2014) comparator study highlights how 
corporate frauds and management behaviours are interconnected. Soltani’s aim is to provide 
a broad perspective of corporate issues, for example from fraud perspective in analysing the 
corporate failures. He used three American examples (Enron, WorldCom and HealthSouth) 
and three European corporations (Parmalat, Royal Ahold and Vivendi Universal). The study 
highlights differences between the two categories of companies in studying corporate failure 
triggers. He sought similarities in his analysis, arguing that the financial scandals arose from 
several incidences of instance ‘corruption’, ‘fraud’, ‘management misconduct’ and ‘unethical 
behaviour’ (Soltani, 2014, p. 264). It contributes to better understanding of why, under 
certain conditions, particular organisational become subject to these issues. Yet, it also raises 
the need to rethink the nature of fraud.  
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) uses a term ‘occupational fraud’ for the 
terminology of fraud. They break down it into three broad classification, such as corruption, 
asset misappropriation, and fraudulent statements. Etymologically, referring to the 
Cambridge English Dictionary (CED), ‘fraud’ means the crime of getting money by 
deceiving people. This does not limit the nature of corruption and other specific offences. 
Arguably, it is true, Soltani’s four categories explaining financial scandals are acts or courses 
of deception, committed by a person(s) against the values of organisation, but they must be 
considered as a classification of fraud. In other words, the positions of corruption and other 
specific offences as mentioned by Soltani’s study are not similar to the positions of fraud. 
This argument is also supported by common law jurisdictions that fraud (deceit) is 
articulated as a tort, in connection with pure economic damage, made by person or entity 
(Murphy, 2016). The emphasis of this definition is on a broader meaning of the disposition 
of being ‘deceitful’ or ‘a dishonest trick or stratagem’. So, based on this reasoning, we note 
that there is overlapping understanding of fraud concept. We have similar understanding 
was ACFE that fraud is an umbrella covering any financial crime for gain that uses deception 
as its principal method.  
The distinction drawn is to ensure clarity when dealing with the subject. It does not mean 
that a specific organisation needs a precise understanding of fraud to avoid a catastrophe. It 
does indicate that clarity is necessary to avoid generalisation in terms of believing all frauds 
have the same antecedents and consequences, since frauds themselves tend to have unique 
characteristics. Treating as similar is likely to lead to flawed safeguards. Cressey (1953) 
‘triangle of fraud’ the foremost model for examining fraud, emerging from the criminology 
and sociology. According to the original study, it is stated that those who committed 
fraudulent activities or white-collar crime are sternly tested by a financial problem referred 
to as non-shareable problems (Cressey, 1953). Many authors, see Akkeren and Buckby 
(2017), Dellaportas (2013) and Kranacher, et al. (2011), note that the theory underpins early 
warning of fraud symptoms. Interestingly enough, Cressey theorised that all three necessary 
pre-conditions, pressure, opportunity and rationalisation must exist together for the trust to 
be violate. If any one of the components in a given situation is absent, fraud would be “highly 
unlikely” to occur.  
The focus on the individual of Cressey’s original work has had an effect on the development 
of fraud and auditing literature. It does, though, not tackle the situations were fraud occurs 
in a social context and through social bonds, see Free and Murphy (2015). ‘Opportunity’, the 
second leg of fraud triangle, considers organisational weaknesses (Cressey 1953; Wolfe and 
Hermanson, 2004: Farber, 2005; Bussmann and Werle, 2006; Kranacher et al., 2011; 
Dorminey, et al., 2012; Dellaportas, 2013). Hence the weaker the organisational defences the 
more likely an individual is to commit fraud. As illustrated in the fraud triangle, the 
translation of opportunities is that the harder the opportunity structure, the less should be a 
person’s intention to commit crime. Yet, this does not take account of the cases, in white 
collar crime, when there is a combination of perpetrators (individuals and organisations) or 
when individuals can come together to create new opportunities for fraud. A broader model 
for fraud is required, taking account of the changing nature of organisation power and the 
strengths of collusive networks. Without such generalisations even well organised fraud 





Dynamics of Corrupt versus Non-corrupt Organisations 
Organisations both internally and externally may be subject to corrupt activity due their 
inherent structures. These structures may be the managerial, the cultural and/or behavioural 
within the organisation, or arising from the society they inhabit. There may develop 
particular (malicious) pressures, between corrupt and non-corrupt organisations either 
internally or externally. As such there may be an effect on a non-corrupt organisation’s fraud 
deterrence capability. Research findings on the relationship between lobbying and 
corruption (Campos and Giovannoni, 2006), confirm that fraudulent conduct may arise 
from effect of the lobbying. Typically this would involve bribery (Campos and Giovannoni, 
2006). Such lobbying is often act as an instrument of influence to relax the rules or gain 
privileges, many firms particularly in developing countries may be willing to acquiesce to 
bribery or lobby bureaucrat to deal with a regulatory constraint (Harstad and Svensson, 
2011). The number of people involved in such a situation is unknown, but several people may 
implicated. It is not an individual act, but may be endemic as the influence spreads through 
the organisation, see Anand et al. (2015) conceptualisation. It can be described within a 
power framework, those with the power dictating to other individuals their actions. As such 
it may be difficult for the employees in such a context to resist given the great pressure to 
defraud (Anand et al, 2015, p. 753). Hence in developing fraud prevention there is a need to 
delve into the organisational factors/influences that give rise to the potential fraud, see 
Anand et al. (2015). 
Furthermore, the interaction between the organisation’s culture and the employees’ 
behaviour with respect to fraud needs exploration when considering fraudulent behaviour. 
Social identity theory provides conceptual focus for the social psychology of intergroup 
relation processes, and the self-conception as consequences of group memberships. The 
centrality of social identity theory is that a person’s sense of who they are in part is based on 
the group to which s/he belongs (Tajfel, 1982, Tajfel and Turner, 2004). Tajfel (1982, p. 255) 
defines social identity as “part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their 
knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and 
emotional significance of that membership”. This theory has broad implication for social 
behaviours within organisation. For example, Pearce, (2013) studies ethical values of 
intergroup relationships related to business issues, built on the theory of social identity. He 
indicates that the ethical position of a business represents the group’s values which then 
form the basis on which individual employee’s judgements and actions. He concludes that 
social identity theory can explain the need for creating a sense of shared values among 
employees by emphasising the ethical and legal aspects from the senior manager. Such issues 
have received a little attention in the fraud literature. 
Carpenter and Reimers (2005) and Cohen et al (2010) employing theory of planned 
behaviour (TPB), have been well received when examining individual intention in the 
context of fraudulent behaviour. Such works represent a simple fraud model, as originally 
proposed by Ajzen (1991). We feel the model TPB, which initially are subject to a conducive 
situation1, will be inappropriate predictor of fraudulent behaviour. The predictive utility of 
the TPB is empirically determined by conscious self-regulatory processes (Ajzen, 1991). In 
term of fraudulent behaviours, however, a system of conscious personal management is 
highly likely to be biased by self-serving motives, for instance through rationalisation or 
moral disagreement (see, Cressey, 1953; Lee et al. 2019). In line with this reasoning, 
Ashforth and Anand (2003) propose conceptual model regarding how corruption becomes 
normalised and embedded phenomenon in the organisation. They argue there are three 
domains – institutionalisation, rationalisation, and socialisation – which are mutually 
reinforcing each other to support the normalisation of corruption.  
The emphasis of those psychological pathways is on individual’s moral reasoning, whether a 
given action (fraud) is acceptable or not. As explained by Bandura’s (1991) social cognitive 
theory, an attractive aspect of antecedents that arises the probabilities of performing 
behaviours is individual’s thought, pertaining how s/he responds and processes the social 
world. It is strongly influential in determining how s/he will interpret messages addressed to 
him/her and how s/he will react to them. In addition, we identify presumably those 
aforementioned prior fraud studies have a little attention on collective beliefs and behaviours 
within organisation, their results empirically at some points conflict each other in terms of 
looking at the way individual thinks and feels about the social issues. These focuses have 
often been overlooked in developing fraud model. It is true, of course, that despite such 
flawed reasoning behind those fraud studies’ conceptions, they are still good to enlighten us 
about how morally upright individuals can routinely engage in fraudulent behaviours. 
Uniquely it is without psychologically experiencing conflict.  
Therefore, based on the above reasoning, exploring the nexus of collective beliefs and 
behaviours, and the role of (moral) cognitive processes largely remains unanswered. Then it 
also needs differential reasoning when proposing fraud deterrent between corrupt and non-
corrupt organisations. It is due to significant differentiations in terms of rhythms of social 
psychologies within organisations that support people to co-offend.  
 
 
                                                            
1 TPB was developed from a situation in which there are no serious social and legal consequences, 
nestled in an individual after performing a certain act. 
Research Design 
This study was conducted in one of corrupt regencies in Indonesia. We believe that our 
results may give new directions for designing fraud prevention. Importantly this study can 
enrich a study completed by Bussmann and Niemeczek (2019), exploring crime (or 
corruption) prevention. They conclude compliance through company culture and values, 
creating and sustaining a strong ethical culture is the key to support people making good 
ethical decisions and behaving ethically. The starting point for this is the articulation of a set 
of values reflecting the successful transfer of a tone from the top and the ethical leadership of 
the immediate superior (p. 809). In the journey to fraud prevention, such initiatives seem 
normative. The temptation to engage in unethical practices can become very strong, 
especially in corrupt organisation, in which it deliberately defeats any systems of internal 
control.  
The situations in corrupt organisations and non-corrupt organisations, as discussed 
previously, are definitely different. Political interests, either micro or macro political 
interests, in corrupt organisations brings behavioural change within an organisation. For 
instance, Brandt and Svendsen (2013) explore why does bureaucratic corruption occur in the 
EU? They argue, the dynamics of bureaucratic corruption in the EU are caused by a well 
linked individuals between an organisation structure and external power. In effect, 
organisations were well-operated by distributing authority and setting a stage for the 
exercise of power. To date, most fraud theoretical or conceptual studies on fraud prevention 
may lack consideration on corrupt organisation dynamics. In other words, we can argue, 
there has been little theoretical advancement or model that can comprehensively explain the 
dynamics of fraud prevention within corrupt organisation. Given this, the current study 
explores such under-researched topics.  
To achieve our goals, we interviewed nine top managers across local agencies and four senior 
local government internal auditors. Specifically, it was conducted in one of local 
governments in East Java Province, Indonesia. There was a balance of males (number) and 
females (number). About 7 participants were male and 6 are female. Since this study is only 
focused on management levels, most of participants were above 30 years old, and only 2 
participants were under 30 years old. With regard to work experience in management 
position, 6 people have experience around 7 to 10 years, 4 people have experience around 4 
to 6 years, 2 people have experience around 2 to 3 years, and only 1 people has experience 
under 2 years. 
The people involved have formal and informal networks with a regent who has been arrested 
by Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission, because of white-collar crime 
syndicates, when running governmental systems. We picked them as informants since they 
have direct experience about specific concern where they have to alter the terms of a 
transaction with private interests in which they operated on behalf of the government. As 
such, they were primary actors in misinforming the government about the cost and quality of 
public goods provision, on behalf of their corrupt regent. Here, we used a semi-structured 
interview – a method of research used most often in the social sciences (Irvine et al. 2013) – 
with face-to-face communication. The advantage of this method is that the interviewer is in 
control of the process of obtaining information from the interviewee (Partington, 2001) with 
focused, conversational, two-way communication. The majority of questions are created 
during the interview, allowing to explore the variations in each participant’s experience of 
evidence-based practice. During interview processes, we encouraged the flexibility without 
influencing the participants’ conceptions or experiences of the topic being explored.   
Furthermore, in dealing with social desirability bias, we used personal networks of a member 
of the research team. We had close friends who work in the Regional People's Representative 
Council and local bureaucracies. Before he met the potential informants, his friends 
introduced him to the targeted informants via phone, and informed about the purposes of 
the project that it was only to enrich fraud prevention literature. We did it to avoid 
unwillingness to provide accurate or honest answers. Acknowledging this, we also informed 
that a set of data would be altered in a way that can no longer be recognised directly or 
indirectly either by the researchers or any other party. It is hoped, preserving anonymity and 
confidentiality are likely to affect the respondent’s decision to answer truthfully (Ong and 
Weiss, 2000). Importantly we said that this interview was voluntary and they could 
withdraw at any stage without having to furnish a reason for leaving. 
Our data analysis is grounded in an idiographic focus, aiming to provide detailed 
examinations of personal lived experience (Eatough and Smith, 2017). We initially outlined 
patterns of meaning across a dataset that provide an answer to the research question being 
addressed. The categories to which each concept is mapped and are then themed. Aspects of 
such interpretative works gave us implicit and explicit ideas within the data. Our approach 
can be subsumed under what Maanen et al. (1982) call “formal sociology”, focusing upon the 
daily life of participants from the inside, as well as identifying the story that each theme tells.  
To go beyond what others have done, we contrasted the social stigma about organisational 
controls, noting that it is the key guardians to safeguard organisation’s assets, with the 
experiences and the reality of participants in corrupt organisations. It is to gain a richer, 
deeper understanding of fraud deterrent, and to build a complex, holistic picture in 
dynamics of organisational controls. 
 
Results and Analysis 
We discussed two major topics with the interviewees, challenges faced by authorities when 
designing a set of internal control systems in the local government, and improvement in the 
efficacy of internal control in order to prevent occupational fraud, especially corruption. For 
the first topic the intended was to provide understanding of the greatest challenges in 
adapting and implementing the COSO internal control framework for local governments. 
This is very important to discuss here because the governmental and not-for-profit arenas 
are not immune from major fraud (Stalebrink and Sacco, 2007), and importantly the COSO 
Board commission expanded framework of internal control for all kinds of organisations, 
from small businesses to community-based social enterprises to government agencies 
(COSO, 2017). So, it is expected to offer comprehensive guidance/warning to improve 
organisational performance and oversight and to reduce the extent of fraud in organisations. 
Then for the second topic is to offer plausible initiatives for local governments/organisations 
regarding how to make occupational fraud manageable.  
 
The Challenges of designing internal controls 
Inadequate references to interpret substantial values  
Tackling occupational fraud locally is a well identified topic which local authorities face as a 
significant challenge. Complexity and the sophistication of modus operandi that evolves in 
fraud faced by the local government requires effective design of internal controls, yet the 
academic literature has not adequately addressed the issues. The following quotes show such 
issues. 
“We have already made improvements on our internal control. I did not know 
why such acts (fraudulent behaviours) are still rampant. We were often invited 
by academia to attend workshops [. . .] it was hoped, we could get new 
perspectives. In fact, the discussion is still too monotone [. . .]” (Interviewee 1).  
Other interviewees added; 
“[. . .] we need works discussing it (how to fix internal control deficiencies). I 
realised, we need numerous suggestions for maximising overall organisational 
control in dynamic and volatile environments” (Interviewee 4). 
“To interpreted academic works is not easy. They used complicated jargons [. . 
.]. And they are based on corporate cases which are totally different from 
governmental cases. For example they said, we need to fit the organisational 
control to the environment by structuring the organisation, not centralised 
approach but more organic when in highly dynamic and uncertain conditions. I 
thought such points did not prevail in governmental contexts” (Interviewee 6). 
It is because;  
“[. . .] Many our local government with thousands of bureaucrats in multiple 
offices have a harder time protecting themselves from internal fraud and 
malicious external influences” (Interviewee 12). 
The above quotes show “expectations gap” between public’s expectations and research 
community on fraud prevention studies. Some parts of arguments above were in line with 
studies completed by Bell and Wright, (1995). They in general state due to the technical 
jargon and quantitative analysis used in the majority of the top auditing/accounting 
journals, few practitioners are able to fully understand the research published in academic 
journals.  
 
Need of expansion for COSO matrices, local government perspectives 
During the interview process, the set of internal control challenges were discussed related to 
fraudulent prevention. Interestingly when we touched such topics, in the absence of a 
comprehensive and conceptually sound framework, some of interviewee mentioned that they 
have difficulties in relating to the COSO matrices espousal of organisational values. Two 
interviewees (5 and 12) mentioned that the more complex the issue, the less likely that 
organisation can overcome challenges related to the design and operation of internal 
controls. These complexities in operations are a widely recognised as threads to the internal 
processes, in which organisation felt dilemma in maintaining a strong system of internal 
controls. As conceptualised by Coram et al. (2008), the degree to which an organisation lacks 
factual information regarding the internal and external operating environment potentially 
can produce negative significant effect on prevention of fraud.  
Then, it is also important, at this point, to note that crime prevention is not just based on the 
internal agency of actors, but also on their shared norms and values.  One of interviewees 
think that the extent diversity in concepts and terminology for fraud risk identification 
process can serve as the primary input to fraud risk responses, as they interact with complex 
operations. See his comment below, saying that  
“[. . .] if we seriously want to prevent fraud, all parts of organisation, not only the 
top echelons of bureaucrats, must work together. Starting from creating ethical 
work climate to concretely applying their benevolent intention to combat fraud” 
(Interviewee 5). 
In today’s business environment, it is not clear how COSO internal control principle 
translate to the control process level within governmental organisation. Substantially, the 
domain of organisational control between governmental and non-governmental 
organisations is likely to be different. The next quotes below provide practical concerns 
associated with the COSO matrix and its relation to fraud activities in local government. 
“The COSO matrices are internally focused, and the context is not established in 
terms of both external and internal factors and influences [. . .] Some points of 
focus may not be suitable or relevant to all entities, especially in the local 
government. So we cannot identify fraudulent or inappropriate activities” 
(Interviewee 3).  
Then another interviewee added that COSO control ‘may’ help minimising the occurrence of 
errors but it cannot provide absolute assurance that fraud will not occur in the future 
(Interviewee 13). There is a greater emphasis on and expectation of redirecting principles of 
internal control into fraud deterrence, designed to reduce internal and external fraud.  
“Types of fraud keep upgrading and adjusting to new tendencies. [. . .] COSO 
control systems tend to be technical [. . .]. To identify the ongoing fraud at an 
early stage [. . .] is often an underappreciated because the objective of COSO 
framework is much focused on the achievement of organisation’s goals” 
(Interviewee 8). 
“We all face the burgeoning fraud acts. We deal with it, but not always, and 
sometimes not very well [. . .] Nowadays, employee fraud can go far beyond the 
standard procedures” (Interviewee 2).  
Similar argument was also accentuated by another interviewee who works at accounting 
and accountability department, saying that, 
“[. . .] At this stage, internal control structure and procedures are much more 
attributed to a wide range of administrative problems, for instance, ranging 
from lack of documentation for transactions, income smoothing, and 
transaction-specific issues” (Interviewee 7). 
In situations when two or more individuals conspired to commit an occupational fraud 
especially corruption cases, internal control structure may often fail to prevent or stop them 
in the future.  
“I am not sure that the COSO framework provides reasonable assurances that 
collusive frauds can be stopped. Those are in fact defeating the internal controls 
or rendering them ineffective” (Interviewee 5). 
These quotes highlight some of the issues with COSO’s framework in public sector in terms 
of developing internal control systems as fraud deterrent. Generally, these quotes show 
COSO’s framework needs to be broadened because it is highly unlikely to prevent corruption 
cases.  
 
Suggestions for alternative fraud deterrence  
Are there alternative fraud deterrence methods for white-collar crime, especially corrupt 
behaviours? Following the observation about COSO, there is a need to focus on the public 
sector and relevant approaches for such, see Cendrowski et al (2010). As mentioned by 
Cendrowski et al (2007), COSO’s primary objective is to provide acceptable assurance 
regarding the achievement of company’s objectives in these categories; (1) Effectiveness and 
efficiency of operations, (2) Reliability of financial reporting, (3) Compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations (p. 121). In this position, we acknowledge its grand design for 
enhancing organisation’s accountability and transparency.   
It is affirmed, based on our previous sections, that a revised set of internal control 
introduced by COSO is only highly likely to prevent the administrative or technical 
occupational fraud, for example Asset Misappropriation and Financial Statement Fraud. 
These results are supported with LaSalle (2007)’s and Cendrowski, et al. (2007) arguments 
stating that the COSO framework as the essential construct for transparency, could prevent 
risk of asset misappropriation or the theft or misuse of an organisation’s assets. Beasley et al. 
(2010) who analyse the occurrences of fraudulent financial reporting investigated by the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) between January 1998 and December 2007, 
provide a comprehensive understanding of COSO framework components and principles.  
The COSO model is designed to improve organisational performance and governance and to 
reduce the extent of fraudulent financial reporting.  The concerns already raised may in the 
paper are not addressed by COSO.   
However, it may become an issue when we look at that situation from a perspective of 
corrupt organisational culture (Campbell and Goritz, 2014) or unethical pro-organisational 
behaviour (Umphress et al. 2010). The COSO model may less likely to function properly in 
such contexts. In such context, it is too naïve to say that government employees in order to 
minimise or deter illicit behaviours just perform their duties and responsibilities with 
integrity at the core of their service.  
There is a strong international consensus that unethical or corrupt behaviour in the name of 
the organisation can control the functions of organisational control (OECD, 2015). Since in 
corrupt organisations many employees facilitate or support each other to achieve a certain 
goal, we doubt that preventive and detective fraud control processes and procedures can 
deter the prevalence of this type of unethical behaviour. As shown prior section, we could not 
identify effects on the relationship between a set of internal control and corruption cases. As 
such, it seems highly likely that prevention will succeed in dealing with corruption. This 
result is in line with OECD (2015)’s report stating that corrupt behaviour cannot be tackled 
with repressive actions alone and a great variety of measures is needed to eradicate 
conditions that lead to its occurrence. Given this, we have explored alternative measures to 
complement the efficacy of the COSO framework when it is faced with corrupt behaviour.  
In the following discussion alternative measures are presented to tackle corruptions in 
culturally corrupt or unethical public sector organisation. Often the underlying cause is that 
people who have power within the organisation perpetrated the corrupt or unethical 
behaviour.  The suggestions presented here can enhance immune systems from any 
wrongdoings, and provide basis for formulating measures to how susceptibility to corruption 
and other conspiratorial acts can be mitigated. 
 
(Unexplored) important points when designing deterrent to corrupt behaviour 
When discussing internal controls to end corruptive behaviours and improve accountability 
and efficiency, some interviewees said that they are all about preventative measures, rather 
than on detection. These people view collusion and concealed corruption as an aspect of the 
exercise of power within a complex social and political structure. The corrupt behaviour is 
rarely disclosed, but those within the system often reveal real anxieties over control systems 
leading to the system to be overly corrupt. 
“[. . . ] Corruption in our country never finishes. We have try to do my job in the 
best ways, [. . .] but our recommendations to prevent it seem useless.” 
(Interviewee 12). 
“No one can make sure that it (corruption) can be stopped. Corruption is like a 
ghost, it is too smooth to be stopped by technical controls [. . .] political networks 
make it becomes more sophisticated [. . .] and the governance and control 
systems are not sufficiently developed [. . .]” (Interviewee 4). 
 
Confronting corruptive behaviour suffers from two issues strategies not running as intended 
or they are faced with too complex challenges. Tough policies by (local) governments can 
establish or strengthen the tackling of corruption when there is already a culture supportive 
of preventing corruption. When there is organisational corruption within the power 
structure then prevention policies become impotent against corruption. One of interviewees 
mentioned that I am just doing my job to obey my boss and we all must be in line with him 
(Interviewee 9). As such if the boss is corrupt then there will be an imperative to follow the 
boss as a bureaucratic consequence of the organisational structure. 
Whilst the suggestions provided during interviews are still to be explored in practice, they do 
indicate a simplification in complexity inherent in the current internal control system. They 
also accommodate communication about issues with internal control among diverse groups 
of related stakeholders. The following quotes indicate some concerns. 
“[. . .] corruptive behaviours from high authorities bring negative effects on the 
implementation of internal controls. They can redirect it as they want. I think 
the system of control must be much more paying attention to it” (Interviewee 7).  
Another interviewee added that 
“[. . .] the internal control mechanisms within governmental agencies failed to a 
large degree. Let’s assume, the head of local government (in district and/or 
province) was good person and he had no intention to take bribes. But if he had 
to face with orders from the top or his political party that made him as the head 
of local government, he had no choice to refuse it” (Interviewee 13).  
Within such complexities, some of interviewees recommended preventive measures must go 
beyond from administrative or technical internal controls. The interviews urged adoption of 
more systematic approach, involving other governmental anti-corruption agencies and civil 
society actors. Any progress on these fronts would take a considerable time, and would 
require serious determination from a wide array of actors and institutions, both locally and 
nationally. Such initiatives will only be credible, durable and eventually successful if they 
gather sufficient support amongst the population as a whole to tackle malevolent interests 
and practices in the governmental agendas (Blake and Morris, 2009, p. 15). 
“[. . .] it was often conspired by high-ranking public officials. [. . .] I advised all 
employees and civil societies report any malpractice, unlawful or unethical 
behaviour to authorised external anti-corruption agency. But it is unacceptable 
for any individual who make a false or malicious report or allegation” 
(Interviewee 2). 
“[. . .] it is imperative to encourage and enable civil society to participate. 
Without independent outsider’s monitoring, controls become less effective to 
operate” (Interviewee 6). 
Another interviewee also encouraged active participation from civil society in preventing and 
combating corruption. 
“Beside other players’ participation [. . .] public awareness about the existence 
or suspicious signs of corruption are also valuable aspect. There is no 
omnipotent player who can eradicate corruption. [. . .] ironically, the existence 
of audit national agencies is often treated as part of the group” (Interviewee 9). 
In a well-designed approaches to prevention of occupational fraud, two of the interviewees 
mentioned, an effective whistleblowing system has an important role in alerting authorities 
of financial crime. 
“If someone found certain red flags, s/he should raise it. With notes, internal 
control procedures ensure that it is both safe and acceptable for employees to 
raise concerns about fraud?” (Interviewee 3). 
And 
“[. . .] an external, independent and secure process for reporting and managing 
alleged workplace misconduct can possible solution [. . .] when it (corruption) 
was committed by higher authority” (Interviewee 5). 
 
Effective whistleblowing systems encourage employees and others to report serious concerns 
about issues related to fraud, see Kaplan et al (2012) and Johansson and Carey (2016). A 
hotline, whether it is using anonymous and non-anonymous reporting channels, can be a 
powerful tool in helping to expose illegal or unethical behaviour. It involves reporting 
misconduct to parties who may be able to take action (Near and Miceli 1985). Although 
whistleblowing systems are considered an important control for detection of fraudulent 
financial reporting, in practice there has been relatively little attention on protection of the 
whistle-blower. 
“[ . . ] there is no big issue with anonymous or non- anonymous channels [ . . .] 
the thing when we raise fraud issue or symptoms, our governments, especially 
law officers who are dealing with it must keep our personal identities…” 
(Interviewee 10). 
“[. . .] I think our government (Indonesia) do not have a law regulating about a 
protection of whistle-blower [ . . .] so they have to concern about it for being 
better…” (Interviewee 1). 
These results are similar to several academic studies that have already proved that a fraud 
hotline is the most effective way to prevent and detect fraud in early stage (e.g. King, 1999; 
Rachagan and Kuppusamy, 2013). By providing a confidential hotline service, whistle-
blowers will report potential wrongdoing, ethical issue, and other concerns with high level of 
confidence. According to Loe et al., (2000) study a confidential hotline service can minimise 
harassment, discrimination and retaliation from suspected wrongdoer. Therefore, to 
increase employees and business’s colleagues makes report of suspicions of malfeasance, 
organisation should establish a whistleblowing policy especially governing whistle-blower’s 
identity protections, and then place an advertisement in the staff break room with a hotline 
number that employees and organisation’s clients can confidentially report suspicious 
fraudulent conducts in the workplace.  
On the other hand, another informant said that: 
“[. . .] ‘tone from the top’ is good in one time, but dangerous in another time [. . 
.] we sometimes or even quiet often got order to manipulate some document [. . 
.] the patterns of ‘tone from the top’ in bureaucracy is dynamic…” (Interviewee 
7). 
The ‘tone from the top’ is also an important ingredient to ensure good governance (Horton, 
2002), setting the overall cultural within a firm (Cohen et al., 2002). However, within a 
bureaucracy or even corporation it can be a powerful weapon to make fraudulent acts 
rampant. Top managements, whether they are bribed or ordered by people who are higher in 
the governmental hierarchy, will use their authority to make fraudulent acts run smoothly. 
This is because everything within a bureaucracy is under control people on the top, and 
subordinates do not have power to make complaints. 
The emphasis here is on the adoption of collaborative fraud prevention. This would require 
integrated initiatives across the public sectors with government and their organisations 
taking a strong stand against corruptive behaviours, with measures to detect corruption as 
soon as it happens and respond effectively to the incidences of corruption when they occur. 
These findings are in line with the results of previous studies, see Ocampo, (2000). These 




In the field of fraud studies interest centres on why people engage in fraudulent activities, 
rather than interventions to prevent it. Few have offered interventions that can deter the 
widespread fraudulent behaviours in local government. In practice, growing concerns of 
illegal activity or serious misconduct is not only experienced by private sectors but also 
public sectors (see ACFE, 2018, for review). As a result, a burden of proof is placed on 
governmental organisations to show they have adequate procedures in place to prevent 
fraud, for example money laundering, bribery or any other new economic crime. 
The Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA) (2015) recommends that state and 
local governments should adopt the COSO’s Internal Control—Integrated Framework as the 
conceptual basis for designing, implementing, operating, and evaluating internal control. 
They argue that it is to provide reasonable assurance that they are achieving their 
effectiveness, efficiency, and safeguarding of assets.  Yet, when governments want to apply 
the tools and concepts of strategic management and internal control in local government, 
they have to understand the distinct nature of the private and public sectors activities. 
Aspects of COSO’s internal control can be implemented in local government domains, but 
allowance has to be made for aspects of governmental sector’s complexities.   
In the design and implementation of internal control that emerges from is the schism 
between research outcomes and practice expectations. Such the apparent disconnects 
between practice and research has led to the substantial issues of ‘translation’ for the COSO 
2013 update to the internal control — integrated framework in public or governmental 
organisations. Within corrupt local governments, fraud prevention studies are of little or no 
value to the practice of fraud prevention. The central problem of practitioners is that there is 
no known empirical guidance to use as a reference for creating and designing effective 
internal control in local governments. Anald et al. (2015) discussed unethical behaviour 
within organisations, noting that practitioners are interested in fraud-prevention 
mechanisms that are efficient not just effective. 
This study has highlighted a change in direction in dealing with fraud. It has discussed the 
issue of organisational corruption and the need to tackle this by collaborative initiatives. The 
focus has previously on three major categories such as corruption, asset misappropriation 
and fraudulent financial statement fraud. Here we have to admit that every single fraud has 
its own characteristics with different antecedences that make it occurs. As such, we cannot 
oversimplify such acts when formulating intervention to deter their widespread in 
organisation. A current study completed by Hauser (2018) proposes regular anti-corruption 
training as one of the most effective ways to prevent corruption. He found, employees after 
obtaining anti-corruption training, regardless of their position, are highly unlikely to engage 
in corrupt practices than those who have not obtained such training. Additionally, he 
documented that such trainings have significant relationship with the likelihood of rejecting 
moral justifications of corruption. 
Under the current situations, the occurrences of fraudulent behaviours, especially corruption 
which are considered as organised crime may no longer be associated with organisational 
weaknesses. A dynamic network in Pinto, et al.’s (2008) study, drawing on a number of 
disciplinary perspectives on examining corrupt behaviours, has enlightened us about why the 
acts of fraud or misconducts remain undetected. Pinto, et al discussed the way in which 
corruption at the individual level can spread to the point where it becomes an organisational 
behavioural phenomenon. When they discussed organization of corrupt individuals (OCI), 
the OCI behaviour is identified as a form of unethical conduct in which the antecedents of 
the OCI phenomenon could be influenced by elements of ethical culture, such as “leadership, 
reward systems, perceived fairness or reciprocity” and a phenomenon of social interaction 
(p. 688-689). Then they also stated that OCI behaviours through perception of others’ 
corrupt actions can provoke other individuals’ tendencies to be corrupt. As consequence, the 
rate of corrupt organisation (CO) will be high or more organisationally widespread (p. 693). 
In line with this reasoning, Murphy and Dacin, (2011) and Brown & Mitchell (2010) argued 
that ‘obedience to authority’ or ‘loyalty to one’s in-group’ is considerable factor that places 
individuals in destructive behaviour.  
More recently Lee et al. (2019) exploring unethical pro-organisational behaviour in different 
cultural contexts (China and the UK), found that employees with high levels of personality 
trait problems tend to engage in unethical behaviour with the intention of helping the 
organisation. Then their results also suggest that a strong group norm (social pressure) in 
the workplace can be the strongest drive than individual-level motives to influence the 
willingness of individuals to engage in unethical pro-organisational behaviour (p. 124). In 
keeping with the literature, it is reasonable to argue that preventive measures for example a 
rule-based approach involving administrative procedures (Scott, 2013), COSO’s internal 
control (Cendrowski et al. 2006), anti-corruption or fraud training (Hauser, 2018; Sampson, 
2010), and ethical interventions aimed at increasing the influence of honest employees 
(Davis and Pesch, 2013), may not significantly effective to prevent, detect, and eliminate 
non-technical fraud or corruption. Additionally, the study by Campbell and Goritz (2014) 
explored organisational culture in corrupt organisations employing Social Identity Theory as 
a basis of their analysis. They found, values and norms of the organisational culture tend to 
be counterproductive. In effect, within corrupt environment, organisational culture is 
determined by the individual’s sense of who they are based on their group membership, and 
so supports active corrupt behaviour and brings about ethical blindness (p. 307). 
To deal with these voids, the current study encourages organisations and/or local 
governments to maintain a cohesive conglomeration of interrelated and interdependent 
specific control functions, which is supported by the adaption of a collaborative fraud 
initiatives. The emphasis of collaboration here is on understanding anything to do with 
designing, managing, participating in or facilitating collaboration to prevent any dishonest 
activity that causes actual or potential monetary losses to organisations. Within the research 
that focuses on collaborative governance, the complexity of inter-organisational 
collaboration in reaction to prior governance failures has been explored, see Ansell and Gash 
(2007), for review.  
Ansell and Gash (2007) argue, collaborative governance has emerged as a response to the 
accountability failures of managerialism. These observations may reduce the likelihood of 
finding the hypothesised positive relationship between a higher incidence of sets of 
organisation antecedents (fraud and board composition, leadership, organisational culture), 
see Zahra, et al. (2005). The value of collaborative approach to public management is to 
improve the overall practice and effectiveness of public administration. It does not only build 
trust between stakeholders but also encounter barriers in achieving governance within 
organisation (Ansell and Gash, 2007). This governing arrangement takes us to a more 
engaged and cooperative approach to governance, in a way that posits causal relationships 
among the related parties. In this sense, this study offers the structure of integrative 
framework that requires broader processes by facilitating collaboration between the public, 
private and community sectors.  
With respect to Ansell and Gash’s (2007) argument about collaborative governance, this is 
also important to argue that the guiding concept of maintaining and achieving governance 
cannot be neatly separated with ‘a commitment’ to minimise adversarial politics within and 
outside organisation. Drawing attention to the fraud studies, the phenomenon of corrupt 
organisations is identical to political elite deviance, or collective corruption (Jancsics, 2019; 
Fazekas and Tóth, 2016), which is notably more complex than non-political fraud. Jancsics’s 
(2019) findings offer a striking note of caution about intensified efforts to extort such acts. At 
a certain level, collective corruption potentially creates constraints, and influence the 
dynamics and performance of organisation controls. Emerging from this context, to achieve 
effective corporate governance, organisation must design a proper and reliable approach of 
identifying and correcting any unlawful or unethical conduct that occurs within their 
organisations. Here we agree with Gans-Morse et al.’s (2018) argument as illustrated in their 
study that collaborative initiatives should be likely to be tied together with a strong 
commitment to combat the threat of illicit behaviours.  
While these findings provide support for the notion about collaborative governance to 
prevent the spread of malevolent acts in organisations, we also identified, whistleblowing 
system is seen as better tool to encourage an employee to disclose illegal and unethical 
activity. Regardless to whom to blow the whistle; whether it is internal or external recipient, 
there are considerable attentions in which a majority of prior studies concern about the legal 
protection of whistle-blowers (e.g. Callahan and Collins, 1992; Dworkin and Baucus, 1998). 
It effects the espoused values, beliefs, and practices of organisation members to decide to 
blow the whistle.  
The question then is how organisations can generate a work environment that encourage the 
disclosure of any wrongdoing. According to Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005), a 
potential whistle-blower who reports wrongdoing often faces severe repercussions, or is 
likely to face the harshest retaliation. In another situation, there is a range of pressures that 
persuade employees to keep silent (Alexander, 2005). On the literature, Nayir and Herzig 
(2012), put great optimisms on anonymous whistleblowing channels to protect people who 
reveal wrongdoing, with Turkey as context of the study. Their finding confirms that people 
are generally reluctant to report their observations about their workplace deviance, but if 
they have intentions to blow the whistle, they require the high level of anonymity. To our 
knowledge, the influence of anonymous reporting channel would be valuable to be explored 
in the future. It is due to the increased complexity of investigating anonymous allegations, or 
due to lower credibility assessment. This require us to be aware of vexatious and malicious 
whistle-blowers who have the potential to cause damage.      
We cannot make more speculation in addressing whistle-blowers issues. Yet. we reasonably 
believe that legal intervention could be successful, if laws were more realistically designed to 
protect the behaviour of whistle-blowers. This is consistent with a study completed by Miceli 
et al (2009), suggesting a unified approach to whistleblower protection. Miceli et al’s (2009) 
study provides us understanding of whistleblowing system based on evidence-based practice. 
They suggest, the reluctance of whistle-blowers to report to law enforcement authorities is 
likely due to the lack of effective legal protections. Fear of suffering retaliation can bring an 
important impact on encouraging employees who observe wrongdoing to blow the whistle. 
As such, Miceli et al. argue that policy-makers must provide stronger support to whistle-
blowers, making whistleblowing more acceptable and positive in the public eye. In addition, 
organisation has to treat whistle-blowers as dedicated individuals to obtain a valuable safety 
net, as anticipation when other forms of regulation fail. Last but not least, organisation 
should make it clear to employees that the raising of fraud (wrongdoing as well as illegal acts 
or omissions) at work is one of ways to be more loyal to organisation, and will not result in 
retaliation against the whistle-blowers. As regards employees can speak out if they find 
wrongful acts in organisation.  
 
Conclusion  
The aim of this study is to provide a warning sign for fraud studies in developing 
occupational fraud deterrent. This study highlights that it is very important to understand 
the concept of fraud and distinguish dynamics of corrupt and non-corrupt organisations. In 
the literature, the generalisation of these concerns obscures these aspects. The unique 
characteristics are often key to understanding corrupt behaviour within the organisational 
framework. Practitioners find an “expectations gap” between investigations of the reasons 
why fraud occurs and the internal controls required to prevent fraud. It highlights some of 
the challenges faced by practitioners and standard setters, when implementing COSO 
internal controls, especially when dealing with the public sector. It would be fruitful for 
researchers to explore the further the nature of fraud schemes and dynamics of corrupt 
(governmental) organisation.  
Preventing corruption is not an easy task. Internal controls may not always be sufficient to 
prevent it. Some people within the study advocated additional controls such as 
whistleblowing systems. This leads to more collaborative ideas of fraud prevention which 
may be capable of preventing corrupt and illegal behaviour which often goes undetected. 
This is parallel to regular ACFE studies, suggesting the existence of effective speak-up 
channels, a hotline, is a proven tool for anti-fraud work (ACFE, 2018). Collaborative action 
was highlighted by Andreeva et al (2014) with the concept of ‘knowledgeable supervision’ to 
tackle public risk. In fraud prevention, it would mean involving anti-corruption agencies 




Limitations and suggestion for further study 
This study has explore a corrupt organisation and interviewed a limited number of 
informants. Initial difficulty arose in gaining access to individuals and this was resolved by 
obtaining formal approval of the research from The National Unity and Political Entity 
(Bakesbangpol). Although not ideal it did allow valuable insights into the nature of fraud 
within a governmental department providing contextualised understanding of some aspect 
of fraud mitigation, especially corrupt behaviour.  
This study advocates whistleblowing system as part of the possible solutions to deal with 
occupational fraud. Yet, we do not have sufficient evident to show which one is better 
between anonymous and non-anonymous channel, and internal or external recipients, to 
encourage individual to exposes secretive information or activity that is deemed illegal or 
unethical. Although whistleblowing system has received considerable attention in the ethics 
literature, there is a need for theoretical discussion or model that is specific to encourage 
more whistle-blowers to speak up about malpractices in organisation (Alleyne et al. 2013). 
Hence to improve its role to the wider public, further study is urged to takes into account 
what should be done by organisations relating to those aforementioned factors.  
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